35. Consider a symmetric game given by following payoff matrix (version of chicken run):

$$A = \begin{array}{c} \\ F \\ B \end{array} \begin{array}{cc} F & B \\ \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 3 \\ 1 & 2 \end{pmatrix} \end{array}$$

Proof that the strategy profile $((\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}), (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}))$ is evolutionary stable.

36. Compute the evolutionary stable strategies of a symmetric game given by following payoff matrix

$$A = \begin{array}{c} \\ F \\ B \end{array} \begin{array}{cc} F & B \\ \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \end{array}$$

37. Determine the replicator dynamics for the Rock-Paper-Scissors Game

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ Rock \\ Paper \\ Scissors \end{array} \begin{array}{ccc} Rock & Paper & Scissors \\ \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & a \\ a & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & a & 1 \end{pmatrix} \end{array}$$